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Abstract
This contribution responds to a research question posed by Billger & Goel 
(2009). Are determinants of corruption in highly corrupt countries differ-
ent from those found in less corrupt countries? To answer this question, 
we use a cross-country quantile regression model that includes new expli-
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cative variables. We address some issues of specification we found in the 
work of Billger & Goel (2009) and we use the broadest and most recent 
data set used until now in such type of research (170 countries with data 
from 2018). We find that the variables size of government and share of 
protestant population are good predictors of the level of corruption only 
for specific levels of corruption, while other variables such as level of de-
mocracy, economic freedom, and income levels are strongly significant for 
all levels of corruption. In contrast to most of the studies in this area, we 
do not find the British colonial heritage to be relevant in explaining the 
current corruption level of a country.
Keywords: Corruption, quantile regression, determinants of corruption.
Resumen
Esta contribución responde a una pregunta de investigación formulada 
por Billger & Goel (2009). ¿Existen diferentes determinantes de la cor-
rupción en países altamente corruptos en comparación con países menos 
corruptos? Para responderla, estimamos un modelo de regresión por cu-
antiles entre países que agrega nuevas variables explicativas. Abordamos 
algunos problemas de especificación que encontramos en el trabajo de 
Billger y Goel (2009) y utilizamos el conjunto de datos más amplio y re-
ciente utilizado hasta ahora en este tipo de investigación (170 países con 
datos de 2018). Encontramos que las variables del tamaño del gobierno y 
la proporción de la población protestante son buenos predictores del nivel 
de corrupción solo para niveles específicos de corrupción, mientras que 
otras variables como el nivel de democracia, la libertad económica y los 
niveles de ingreso son muy importantes para todos los niveles de corrup-
ción. A diferencia de la mayoría de los estudios en esta área, no encontra-
mos que la herencia colonial británica sea relevante para explicar el nivel 
actual de corrupción de un país.
 Palabras claves: Corrupción, regresión por cuantiles, determinantes de 
la corrupción. 
1. Introduction
There is now a broad consensus in the literature that corruption, commonly defined 
as an abuse of public power for private gains, negatively impacts on the development 
of a country (Aidt, 2009). It is also widely agreed that this development requires a 
set of institutions and policies that stimulate both political and economic inclusion 
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in order to facilitate growth and a sustainable development (Rodrik, Subramanian, & 
Trebbi, 2002; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; and Baland, Moene, & Robinson, 2010).
Corruption undermines development at two levels. On the one hand, corruption can 
be used to circumvent the existing rules, e.g. through bribes or favours, or by embez-
zling funds or manipulating information. On the other hand, corrupt practices can 
be used as a means to directly capture and influence the rules of the game. Indeed, 
the policies and institutions required for sustainable development are themselves to 
a large degree the result of a political process that is at risk of being influenced by 
interest groups. The fact that many countries struggle with the implementation of 
such “good” institutions and policies usually does not seem to be the consequence of a 
lack of knowledge, but rather the result of the influence exerted by certain actors who 
distort the policy making processes in order to safeguard and foster their own narrow 
interest in the status quo (Grossman & Helpman, 1994).
With the growing body of quantitative and qualitative evidence of these negative im-
pacts of corruption, the importance of minimizing corruption has gained in impor-
tance both in the policy arena and in research. During the last 24 years, since the 
launch in 1995 of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 
the research on corruption increased impressively.3 Perhaps one of the most fertile 
areas has been the cross-country empirical research into the causes and consequences 
of corruption (Lambsdorff, 2006). The findings have contributed significantly to im-
proving our understanding of the phenomenon, but there are still many contested 
issues. For instance, the roles of the size of government, of cultural and historical 
factors, or of the level of democracy as determinants of corruption remain unclear.
Perhaps Danila Serra has undertaken the most thorough analysis into of the deter-
minants of corruption (Serra 2006). The author conducts a global sensitivity analysis 
based on Leamer’s Extreme-Bounds Analysis in order to detect which variables com-
monly used in the literature as determinants of corruption survive this robustness 
check. Her analysis finds that only five variables are robustly related to corruption. 
Countries with more years of continuous exposure to democracy, a higher degree of 
political stability, higher income per capita levels, and a higher share of protestant 
population, have lower levels of corruption. In addition, the colonial heritage (Brit-
ish) significantly predicts the present level of corruption of a country.
3 A search in Scopus for the word “corruption” in the title, yields 60 publications in 1996, and the number stea-
dily increased since then. The average number of publications per year between 2000 and 2018 has been of 373 
articles. 
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In turn, Billger & Goel (2009) contributed to the literature on the determinants of 
corruption by looking at the conditional distribution of the phenomenon across 
countries. Specifically, they wondered if determinants of corruption are different in 
highly corrupt countries and in countries with low levels of corruption. The answer to 
this question is relevant both in improving our understanding of corruption and from 
a policy perspective. If there are differences according to the level of corruption, then 
the policies adopted to controlling the phenomenon should also be differentiated4.
To answer their research question, Billger & Goel (2009) used a sample of 99 coun-
tries and a quantile regression model. Their results confirm some of the findings in 
previous contributions to the literature, but they also added new insights. For in-
stance, the authors find that changes in the level of economic freedom do not have 
the expected corruption-reducing effects in countries with high levels of corruption. 
In turn, the level of democracy does reduce corruption level in the most corrupt coun-
tries, while the effect of the size of government is ambiguous. However, the authors 
did not include some variables that from a theoretical point of view could be relevant 
in explaining corrupt levels; and limited the data set to information from the years 
2001 to 2003. We furthermore argue that some of the variables they used were not 
specified adequately, as we will explain in more detail below. 
Therefore, our contribution aims at answering the question raised by Billger & Goel 
(2009). To do this we improve the model by adding additional variables empirically 
found relevant by Serra (2006), increase econometric rigour and use a more repre-
sentative data set. Our database updated for the year of 2018 and comprising 170 
countries is, to our best knowledge, currently the broadest dataset used in this type 
of research.
Our findings confirm that there are differences in the determinants of corruption 
across countries according to their levels of corruption. The variables size of govern-
ments and proportion of protestant population are good predictors of corruption only 
for countries with specific levels of corruption. In contrast to Billger & Goel (2009), 
we find that the level of democracy and the level of economic freedom are strongly 
significant determinants of corruption for all levels of corruption. Finally, and in con-
trast to the majority of related studies, the British colonial heritage does not turn out 
to be significant in any of our quantiles. Possibly, this is due to the extensive dataset 
we used, where corrupt countries that were former British colony not taken into ac-
count in previous research were included. However, here we do not aim to expand on 
the empirical results we obtained, leaving this for future research.
4 For a recent similar, although qualitative argument, see (Johnston, 2014).
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The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the variables that 
are brought forward by both theory and empirical studies as determinants of corrup-
tion levels. Sections three and four explain in detail the data and the methodology we 
used. Section five displays and discusses our results; section six concludes.
2. Corruption and its determinants
Since the mid-1990s, a broad strand of literature aims at exploring the determinants 
of corruption both theoretically and empirically. Following Serra (2006), Lambsdorff 
(2006) and Dreher, Kotsogiannis, & McCorriston (2007), it is possible to classify the 
variables that explain corruption levels in four groups.
Group A: Political and economic institutions. This group contains variables ex-
plaining corruption that are related to the characteristics of the political regime of the 
countries, the effectivity of the justice system, and the level of economic freedom. The 
hypothesis is that corruption levels might be caused by weaknesses in these areas. 
Sandholtz & Koetzle, (2000) for instance, study the variation of perceived levels of 
corruption in a sample of 50 countries by proposing a set of variables related to the 
political and economic structure of the countries, democracy levels, and the degree of 
integration into the international economy. The authors find that corruption levels 
are higher with weak democratic institutions.
Group B: History. Theory suggests that the past strongly determine the institu-
tional, political and cultural characteristics of a country today (North, 1990, p 93). 
The empirical literature on determinants of corruption has focussed on the influence 
of the colonial history as an indicator of historical components. Some studies such 
as La Porta (1999) and Treisman (2000) show that countries that have been a Brit-
ish colony tend to have lower levels of corruption, supposedly because of the British 
influence on democratic traditions and the characteristics of the judicial institutions.
Group C: Culture. This group contains social and cultural variables that could influ-
ence corruption levels. Most of studies have focused on the impact of religious beliefs 
as an important fundamental of social attitudes and family values that could explain 
the level of tolerance vis-à-vis corrupt practices. Most studies argue that religions 
that are more rigid in their structure tend to favour the conservation of the status 
quo and may thus be more tolerant with respect to corruption. Therefore, countries 
with a higher share of Protestants could be expected to exhibit lower levels of cor-
ruption. Various studies indeed find that the percentage of Protestants or the fact of 
having a majority of Protestants is in a good predictor of corruption levels (Sandholtz 
& Koetzle (2000), Treisman (2000), Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2007) and Picón (2012)).
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Group D: Economy. Finally, there are a series of economic variables that have been 
put forward in explaining levels of corruption. Studies typically consider the level of 
a country’s integration into the international economy, the economic development of 
a country, as well as the size of government and its influence on the economy (Lamb-
sdorff, 2007, p. 4). The empirical evidence suggests that the lower the income per 
capita level, the lower the integration of the country into the world economy and the 
bigger the size of its government, the higher the level of corruption tend to be (Serra 
(2006), Lambsdorff (2006), Picón (2011) and Picón (2012)).
3. Data
For our study, we use the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transpar-
ency International for 2018 as our dependent variable. We multiply the CPI by -1 to 
obtain an index that permits a more intuitive interpretation of the results in which 
a higher score reflects a higher level of perceived corruption. The use of the CPI as a 
proxy for the level of corruption is justified due to the strong correlation of this index 
with other, comparable, indicators (Alesina & Weder (2002), Picón (2012)).
Concerning the explanatory variables, we use the following data and classify them 
according to the groups presented in the previous section (see table 1).
  Table 1. Data description and sources
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Corruption
Corruption Perception Index 2018, multiplied 
with -1 to indicate that the index increases 
with increasing levels of perceived corruption 
(-100 least corrupt; 0 most corrupt).
Transparency 
International
Economic 
Prosperity
Gross National Income per capita 2018 (PPP, prices 
2011). Taken from the World Bank DataBank. 
For North Korea an estimate based on Maddison 
(2001) and published by the CIA were used. 
World Bank and 
Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA)
Democracy
Sum of the 2018 indicators for Political Rights and 
Civil Liberties from “The Freedom in the World”. 
Each country is scored from 2 to 14, where 2 
represent the highest freedom and 14 the lowest 
freedom. The scores are multiplied with -1 to 
indicate that the index rises with increasing levels of 
“democracy” measured this way (-14 least democratic 
countries; -2 most democratic countries).   
Freedom House
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VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Economic 
Freedom
Index of Economic Freedom, calculated as the 
average of the following indicators: Business 
Freedom, Labor Freedom, Monetary Freedom, 
Trade Freedom, Investment Freedom, and 
Financial Freedom, all from 2018. 
Authors based on 
indicators by The 
Heritage Foundation 
and The Wall 
Street Journal
Size of 
Government
Index of Government Expenditures 2018.
The Heritage 
Foundation and The 
Wall Street Journal 
Protestants
Proportion of persons with Protestant religion per 
country, according to the available data for 2018.
Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and 
Religious Freedom 
Report by U.S. 
State Department
British 
Colony
Dichotomous variable with value 1 if the 
country has been a British colony, 0 if not. 
Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and 
World Statesmen
Source: Authors
group A: Political and economic institutions. Just as Billger & Goel (2009), in the 
study we include as a measure of the level of democracy the sum of the indicators of 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties used by Freedom house’s “Freedom in the World 
2018” report. Each country is assigned a value between 2 and 14, where 2 represents 
the freest countries (most democratic) and 14 the least free (least democratic). Again, 
we multiply the values by -1 to obtain an index that increases with the level of “de-
mocracy” measured this way. Concerning economic freedom, (Billger & Goel, 2009), 
we use the Index of Economic Freedom published by The Heritage Foundation and 
The Wall Street Journal. However, the use of this index is problematic here consider-
ing that some of its indicators, such as the level of government expenditures, could 
entail problems of multicollinearity with the variable Size of Government, which is 
also used by the authors and is measured by dividing public spending by GDP. This de-
cision may explain the ambiguous results obtained by the authors with respect to the 
role played by the size of government in explaining corruption levels. In our study, we 
try to be closer to the objective of the index and its methodology and use the average 
of its following indicators: Business Freedom, Labor Freedom, Monetary Freedom, 
Trade Freedom, Investment Freedom, and Financial Freedom, all of them for the year 
of 2018. By doing so, we avoid the problem mentioned before and can expand the list 
of countries used in our sample.
Group B: History. To capture the historical factor of colonial heritage, we use a di-
chotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the country was a British colony and 0 if 
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not. This variable was generated based on information available at the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (The World Factbook) and complementary information published by 
the organization World Statesmen.
Group C: Culture. As a cultural variable, we take the proportion of Protestants in 
each country according to the available data for 2018. The variable was generated 
based on information by the Central Intelligence Agency (The World Factbook) and 
the report on Religious Freedom issued by the U.S. Department of State.
Group D: Economy. As an indicator for economic prosperity, we use the Gross Na-
tional Income per capita 2018 (PPP, prices for 2011). The main source of information 
used was the Human Development Report data. For North Korea, we used as a proxy 
an extrapolation of the results from Maddison (2001) published by the CIA World 
Factbook as this country does not present official data on aggregated production or 
income. As an indicator for the size of government, in turn, we use the index for Gov-
ernment Spending 2018 published by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street 
Journal. This index is based on the level of public expenditures, including govern-
ment consumption and transfers as percentage of GDP, and does not try to identify 
an optimal level of Government Spending as this may vary from country to country 
depending on culture, geography and development. According to the methodology, 
the scale of this index is non-lineal: countries that have expenditures close to zero are 
slightly penalized, while level of expenditures superior to 30% of GDP receive a score 
much worse as a the result of the quadratic function used. Therefore, only very big 
governments receive low scores. 
To our knowledge, the database we use is, with information from 170 countries from 
2018, the broadest and most recent database used to date in similar studies. For the 
first time, we include countries such as North Korea and some African countries, such 
as Lesotho, Gambia, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Swaziland that are usually not included 
due to lack of data. In our case, it was still impossible to include Somalia for that reason.
4. Methodology
In order to answer the research question, it is necessary to analyse the values of the 
different determinants for each level of corruption. However, the great majority of 
studies use econometric tools based on least square regression that do not allow for 
such type of analysis. Picón (2011) and Picón (2012) classify countries by quartiles 
according to their level of corruption using neural networks to identify which ex-
planatory variables are doing best in classifying the countries. However, neural net-
works present limitations in terms of the characteristics of the coefficients produced 
by these classifications.
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In this study, we therefore use a regression by quantiles5, allowing us to carefully ana-
lyze the determinants of corruption over the whole range of the levels of corruption, 
paying particular attention to the most and to the least corrupt countries.
According to Koenker & Bassett (1978), a general quantile regression model can be 
expressed as:
yi = ∑βj(q) xij + εi(q)
Where 0 < q < 1 designates the proportion of the population with scores below the 
quantile qth. Therefore, for each observation i, let εi be the residual:
εi
q = yi – ∑βj(q) xij
     j
Thus, a regression for a specific quantile qth (with q ∈ (0,1)) is the solution of:
q|yi – x'i β| + (1 – q)|yi – x'i β|min ∑ ∑
The algorithm to solve this problem is taken from Hunter & Lange (2000) and imple-
mented in STATA statistical software by sqreg command, which estimates simulta-
neous-quantile regression and obtains an estimate of the variance covariance matrix 
via bootstrapping, including between-quantile blocks. Consequently, we can test and 
build confidence intervals associating coefficients describing different quantiles.
  Table 2. Determinants of corruption OLS regression 
and regression by quantiles 2018
Variables MCO Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
Economic 
Prosperity
-0.415*** -0.414*** -0.551*** -0.508*** -0.408*** -0.256***
(-6.96) (-3.56) (-5.08) (-5.56) (-4.59) (-2.53)
Democracy 
-0.325*** -0.271*** -0.342*** -0.334*** -0.383*** -0.379***
(-6.34) (-2.69) (-4.14) (-4.54) (-5.16) (-6.28)
Economic Freedom
-0.265*** -0.341*** -0.21** -0.189*** -0.218*** -0.23***
(-4.72) (-2.51) (-2.05) (-2.48) (-2.99) (-3.56)
5 A general introduction of the model can be found in (Hao & Naiman, 2007). (Billger & Goel, 2009) recom-
mends (Koenker & Hallock, 2001) as a helpful introduction to quantile regression.
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Variables MCO Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
Size of Government 
0.123*** 0.168* 0.087 0.085 0.104 0.133***
(2.75) (1.73) (1.23) (1.46) (1.58) (3.30)
British Colony 
-0.008 0.006 -0.024 0.013 -0.141 -0.171*
(-0.11) (0.04) (-0.19) (0.12) (-1.13) (-1.68)
Protestants
-0.105*** -0.073 -0.138*** -0.107** -0.074 -0.042
(-3.31) (-0.72) (-2.6) (-2.16) (-1.35) (-0.97)
Constants
0.002 -0.546*** -0.28*** 0.037 0.378*** 0.605***
0.05 (-5.61) (-4.14) (0.58) (5.81) (11.74)
Notes: The dependent variable is the inverted Corruption Perceptions Index (Corruption in Table 1).
The model includes a sample of 170 countries with data from 2018.
The results from the quantile regression are based on 1000 bootstrap repetitions.
The lower quantiles (for example Q10) represent the countries with the lowest levels of perceived corruption.
All the quantitative variables have been standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
The absolute values of the t statistics are given in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote the levels of significance of 
the coefficients at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively.
5. Results
First, we can observe that for the OLS estimation all proposed variables with excep-
tion of being a British colony are significant. Being a British colony also does not seem 
to be an important factor in the conditional distribution by quantiles. A possible ex-
planation could be the size of our sample; by including countries with high levels of 
perceived corruption that used to be a colony of the British Empire but were excluded 
in former studies, the result stating a positive influence of British colonial history 
vanishes6.
Second, our results confirm the relevance of indicators related to economic prosper-
ity such as income per capita levels. In this case, income per capita results turns out 
to be highly significant both on average and over the whole distribution in quantiles. 
Third, in contrast to the results obtained by Billger & Goel (2009), we find that de-
mocracy and economic freedom are highly significant in when explaining levels of 
perceived corruption over the whole distribution and not only for countries with the 
highest levels of corruption. Countries with low levels of democracy and economic 
6 Some of the African countries included as British colony are Lesotho, Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Gambia, 
Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Egypt, Swaziland, Tanzania and Uganda. Some countries, such as 
Swaziland, were included as a British colony even though the country was a colony only in the XX century. It 
is left for discussion whether this choice is adequate. Our objective here is to show that the mere presence of 
British colonization is not a good indicator for low corruption levels.
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freedom tend to have higher levels of corruption over the whole sample. Again, the 
difference between the results from Billger & Goel (2009) and ours may be explained 
by the size of our sample.
Fourth, the variable Size of Government is significant on average but not over the 
whole distribution of quantiles of corruption levels. Indeed, the size of the govern-
ment seems to be relevant in when explaining levels of corruption for the most corrupt 
countries and the least corrupt countries, but not for the countries with intermediate 
levels of corruption. This seems to indicate that increasing government spending is a 
risk in particular for the most corrupt countries, where such an increase would prob-
ably come along with a further increase in their level of corruption.
Finally, the proportion of Protestants is significant on average as indicated by the 
OLS regression. However, when looking at the quantile results, we can observe that 
this is not consistent over the whole distribution. The variable is only significant only 
for intermediate levels of corruption and the least corrupt countries. Before specu-
lating on possible explanations for this result, in our view the most plausible one is 
that the result depends more upon the distribution of the countries as than on a real 
causal relationship between both variables.
6. Conclusions
We revisited an interesting research question put forward by Billger & Goel (2009) us-
ing a broader sample of countries and improving the specifications of some variables. 
We find that indeed there are differences in the relevant determinants of corruption 
between countries with different levels of corruption.
The size of the government and the proportion of Protestants in the population are 
only good predictors of corruption only for specific levels of corruption. The size of 
the government is relevant only for the most and the least corrupt countries, but not 
for the countries with intermediate levels of corruption. In addition, the proportion 
of Protestants significantly predicts levels of corruption only for intermediate levels 
of corruption and the least corrupt countries.
Our results differ from those published by Billger & Goel (2009) with respect to the 
importance of democracy and economic freedom. The authors found that the level of 
democracy predicts corruption only for the most corrupt countries, while the level 
of economic freedom is relevant in explaining corruption only for the least corrupt 
countries. Our results show that these two variables are highly significant for all lev-
els of corruption.
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Finally, in contrast to most other contributions to this strand of literature, in particu-
lar the extreme bounds analysis by Serra (2006), we do not find the British colonial 
legacy to be significant for any level of corruption. We suggest that our finding can be 
explained by the broad sample; we were able to include countries with high levels of 
corruption and British colonial history that were excluded in previous studies.
Despite the number of contributions on determinants of corruption, we think that 
there is still room for exploring in more depth the causes of corruption by exploiting 
differences in corruption levels and by using more countries and more recent datasets. 
The empiric specification of the variables suggested by theory can also be improved 
as new indexes emerge. Our findings here in particular suggest that there is room for 
increasing our understanding about the historical characteristics of the countries, as 
the colonial heritage alone seems to be a poor proxy, at best.
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